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Specification and Analysis of Inter component Communication
T he correctness, safety, and robustness of the specification of a critical system are assessed through a combination of rigorous specification capture and inspection; formal analysis of the specification; and execution and simulation of the specification. Any integrated approach to specifying critical systems should support all three activities.
Embedded critical systems pose particularly difficult problems in writing and validating software requirements. For example, the software for such systems is required to interact with a variety of analog and digital components in its environment, must detect and recover from error conditions in the environment, and is often subject to rigorous safety and performance constraints.
The interfaces between the software and the embedding environment are a major source of costly errors. For example, during integration and system testing of two spacecraft, 20 to 35 percent of safety-related errors discovered were related to these interfaces. 1 Problems often arise from misunderstandings about how the hardware operates, incompatibilities in the timing between the sending and receiving sides, failure to detect and respond to inputs outside the normal operating regime, and failure to prevent the generation of undesirable outputs. [1] [2] [3] In addition, the software's operating environment is likely to change over time. These factors make providing reliable systemlevel intercomponent communication for critical systems extremely difficult.
Thus, it is imperative that requirements specification for an embedded software system rigorously capture the interfaces and communication between the software and its embedding environment. Furthermore, a specification language should support analysis techniques helping to assure that At an abstract level, we can view an embedded control system as a collection of physically distinct components communicating over unidirectional communication channels. This view is adopted in the Requirements State M achine Language (RSM L), which was used successfully to model TCAS II (Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System II). 4 TCAS II is a large commercial avionics system that the US Federal Aviation Administration requires on all aircraft with more than 30 seats.
O ur work extends and refines RSM L to support rigorous specification and analysis of system-level intercomponent communication. We began by identifying several properties the communications definition must possess. First, it must be easy to understand because the communication's basic features are often determined early in the project, and many different stakeholders will be involved in the process. Second, Bonnie M elhart 3 and N ancy Leveson and her colleagues 4 have discussed a collection of fundamental assumptions about intercomponent communication that should always be captured in the specification of an embedded system. O ur formalism must support the capture of such properties. Finally, changes to the software's embedding environment and consequently its communication requirements will inevitably occur. Therefore, we encapsulate communication information in welldefined and changeable units.
Encapsulation also allows us to greatly reduce the com-plexity of analyzing the interfaces for certain properties. We can view the interfaces as simple safety kernels and enforce constraints within these kernels. This approach to constraint enforcement is not unique to our work: N ancy Leveson and her colleagues discussed the use of a safety kernel to enforce safety policies in critical systems. 5 Using a kernel centralizes the enforcement of safety policies as well as the detection and recovery of safety violations in one small, easily verifiable component.
John Rushby has provided a detailed and formal discussion of the suitability of a kernel approach for safety enforcement. 6 O ur work is largely inspired by Rushby's discussion.
O ther approaches to high-level specification of embedded system behavior, in particular SCR (Software Cost Reduction) used in the Core (Consortium Requirements Engineering) method, 7, 8 advocate rigorous capture of information about the monitored and controlled variables in the software's environment. This work-with its roots in the pioneering specification of the control software for the A7 aircraft 9 -has helped shape our approach to the specification of intercomponent communication. Core advocates a semiformal capture of the interfaces between components and the assumptions about the various measured and controlled variables related to the interfaces. In contrast, our work takes a fully formal approach to the communication specification.
Formalizing the specification allows us to automatically verify certain types of communicationrelated constraints. O ur analysis procedures allow us to check a specification for three properties:
• 
COMMUNICATION MODEL
RSM L was developed as a requirements specification language specifically for embedded systems. The language is based on hierarchical finite state machines and is in many ways similar to Statecharts. 10 In RSM L, a system is a collection of components connected by communication channels. The components are connected to the channels through interfaces and can send messages over the channels. A message is a collection of fields holding the atomic pieces of information communicated among components. The only information flow among the components is through these unidirectional channels.
O ur formalism clearly distinguishes between a component's inputs, outputs, and internal state. Input and output variables define every data item entering and leaving a component. The state machine can use both input and output variables when defining the transitions between states. H owever, the input variables represent direct input to the component and can only be set when receiving the information from the environment. In contrast, the state machine can set output variables and present them to the environment through output interfaces. This clear separation between inputs, outputs, and internal state allows description of the communication (and assumptions about it) without considering the component's detailed behavior.
We use a layered approach in our formal definition of RSM L communication mechanisms, employing Alan Shaw's Communicating Real-Time State M achines 11 to define the semantics of a collection of low-level RSM L communication primitives. We then provide a highlevel notation that supports encapsulating the intercomponent communication in interface specifications.
Low-level foundation
O ur formalism defines transitions in the state machines as guarded com m ands (condition → action). In this notation, the arrow implies that when the condition is true, the transition is taken and the action performed. The guard is a Boolean expression, and the command is an I/O action (send or receive data) or a variable assignment. 11 The guarded commands and synchronous communication mechanism are simplified versions of CSP (Communicating Sequential Processes). Communication occurs through channels between components. O ur model considers the channels perfect (no loss or propagation delay) and models one-to-one communication between two state machines.
Relationship to hierarchical state machines. RSM L has a trigger(condition)/action defining the transitions' semantics. The guarded-command notation in Shaw's model can be used to model the event(condition)/action semantics. Events can be viewed as Boolean variables, and the event(condition)/action transition predicate is rewritten (event ∧ condition) → action in Shaw's notation. Essentially, we have we can implement any other communication scheme, such as stimulus response.
We have defined two primitives to model interruptdriven communication: SEN D(〈channel〉,〈message〉) and RECEIVE(〈channel〉,〈message〉). In terms of RSM L's and Statecharts' event-action semantics, SEN D is an action that sends message 〈message〉 over channel 〈channel〉. RECEIVE is a trigger event that occurs when a component receives 〈message〉 over the channel.
For continual communication, we also use two primitives: PUBLISH (〈channel〉,〈message〉) and READ (〈channel〉,〈message〉). Both primitives are actions in the RSM L semantics. PUBLISH posts a message on the channel, and the information is persistent and remains available on the channel until another PUBLISH command to the same channel overwrites it. READ retrieves information from the channel; it does not change the information on the channel.
We use Shaw's communicating state machines to formally define the semantics of these four RSM L communication primitives. For brevity, we do not discuss these formal definitions.
High-level specifications
The four communication primitives together with other RSM L constructs are adequate to fully model system-level intercomponent communication. Indiscriminate use of the communication primitives, however, may lead to unstructured and difficult-to-understand models. A state-based model that has its communication with the environment distributed throughout the model can be very difficult to understand and maintain. Thus, communication with the environment must be encapsulated in well-defined modules within each component. For example, in TCAS II all communication with one of the pilot displays (the resolution advisory display) is confined to a small state machine dedicated to this task. Encapsulating the communication in dedicated state machines will shield the main parts of an RSM L specification from the inevitable changes in the embedding environment (Figure 1 ).
To facilitate specification and encapsulation, we supply a high-level textual language based on our communication primitives. TCAS II uses a similar approach to specifying the communication mechanisms. 4 O ur definitions are an extension and refinement of this approach.
We present the simple interface definitions in Figure  2 to better explain their use. Interface definitions consist of two parts:
• a physical-interface definition, which captures properties related to the physical aspects of the The physical-interface definition assures that connected components have compatible properties. For example, such definitions may spell out that the expected arrival rate at the RECEIVE side is greater than or equal to the expected send rate at the SEN D side. O ur interface definition is an abstraction of a simple state machine using the basic RSM L communication primitives. N aturally, the state machine could directly specify the intercomponent communication. But the state machine is very simple, and depicting it only adds visual clutter to the graphical RSM L model. We therefore used a purely textual notation as an abstraction for the state machines defining the communication. The textual notation also forces encapsulation of all communication information in the interface definitions.
The interfaces in Figure 2 represent two distinct physical components communicating over PressureChannel. For the input interface, when a component receives a message and the guarding condition on one handler is satisfied, the handler will perform the assignments defined for it and generate its output ********************************** Report for channel Pressure_Channel ********************************** => Error: channel Pressure_Channel has input load (4)LESS THAN output load (5). => Error: input variable Measured_Pressure has expected max less than the expected max of the output variable (Pressure_Reading) to which it is being assigned. => Warning: inconsistent units defined for variable Pressure_Reading. Output is (mBar) and input is (psi). ********************************** End Report ********************************** action. For the output interface, when a state machine in the main part of the specification generates the interface's trigger event, and the handler's guarding condition is satisfied, the handler performs its output action.
Both interfaces have a load, and min and max separations. The load is the expected average number of messages per unit time (in this case seconds). The min separation is the minimum amount of time required between messages. Similarly, the max separation is the maximum amount of time between messages. Although the examples in Figure 2 have only one handler in each interface, practical interface definitions may have several; we give examples of realistic interface definitions later.
Input and output variable definitions are similar to those for interfaces. Variables are typed and require specification of assumed minimum and maximum values. Input variables can only be assigned by an input interface when a component receives a message from the environment. O utput variables, on the other hand, can be assigned at any time. An output variable is assigned a new value when the state machine generates the trigger event for the variable-for example, SetPressure-Event-and the variable is assigned the value of the Value expression (in this case, function ReadPressure). Both input and output variables can be assigned an optional unit indicating the physical entity the variable represents. Figure 3 shows an example of input and output variable specifications.
Given the information about the physical communication, the assumptions about the input and output variables, and the handlers in the interfaces, we can perform various types of analysis. We have developed a set of prototype tools supporting the analysis of systemlevel intercomponent communication.
INTERFACE COMPATIBILITY ANALYSIS
Interface definitions contain information about the physical aspects of the intercomponent communication. To connect two interfaces over a channel, the interfaces must have compatible definitions as well as compatible input and output variables. 2, 3 Specifically:
• For SEN D-RECEIVE channels, this means that the max separation of the input side must be greater than or equal to that of the output side. Also, the min separation on the input side must be less than or equal to that of the output side.
Each input handler in an input interface must match with every output handler in the corresponding output interfaces at the channel's other end. This match ensures that the input handler can accept all possible combinations of output. For an input handler to match, it must assign the same number and type of input variables as the output handler sends on the channel. Each type of variable requires different checks.
For integers, the expected minimum of the output variable (which comes from the sending component) must be greater than or equal to the expected minimum of the corresponding input variable (at the receiving component). The expected maximum of the output variable must also be less than or equal to the expected maximum of the corresponding input variable.
O ur tools currently support integer and enumerated variable types. Enumerated variables are compatible if the types are the same. If the types are not the same, and the type of the output variable has fewer possible values than the type of the input variable, the tool will issue a warning that the output does not use all the enumerations of the input. If the type of the output variable can have more enumerations than the type of the input variable, overflow is possible, and the tool reports an error.
Consider the interface specifications and variables defined earlier in Figures 2 and 3 . Suppose a change in system requirements prompts the replacement of the pressure-sensing device sending information over Pressure-Channel. To satisfy the new requirements, the new device is both faster (the load is now 5 instead of 3) and is sending a variable with a wider range than the previous device (0 to 512 instead of 0 to 255). Given this change in the assumptions about the intercomponent communication, our tool will generate the error report in Figure 4 . This analysis tool helps find problems in the initial systems architecture and highlights potential problems as the components in the system evolve over time.
CONSTRAINTS AND THEIR VERIFICATION
Because our approach encapsulates all communication in the interfaces, a handler's guarding condition is effectively a precondition for the communication defined by it. The formality of the communication definition allows us to ensure that the input and output definitions are consistently and completely defined. It also allows us to prove that some safety and liveness constraints always hold in the model.
During the TCAS project, we discovered that the guarding conditions required to accurately capture the requirements were often complex. The predicate logic notation traditionally used to define these conditions did not scale well to complex expressions, because it quickly became unreadable.
To overcome this problem, we introduced a tabular notation for defining the guarding conditions. These AN D/O R tables, 4 shown as part of the interface definition in Figure 5 , are read columnwise. For a particular column of T/F values to be true, the truth values listed in it must match the truth values of the conditional statements on the left. That is, if the value in the column is T, then the predicate should be true. If it is F, then the predicate should be false. A dot indicates that the predicate's value can be either true or false. Therefore, the set of conditions represented by an AN D/O R table is evaluated as true if any column is true.
To illustrate constraint verification, we use an example taken from TCAS II and shown in Figure 5 . The state machine model for TCAS II must model 30 intruding aircraft (O ther-Aircraft). The model of each O ther-Aircraft contains state machine Traffic-DisplayStatus. When TCAS detects an intruder and determines that it must notify the pilot, the TrafficDisplay-Status state machine associated with that intruder will enter state Waiting-To-Send. This indicates that TCAS is ready to send an advisory to the pilot's display regarding this particular intruder. (An advisory is a notice to the pilot. If the intruder is very close, TCAS will send a resolution advisory.)
If TCAS needs to notify the pilot about more than one intruder (there is more than one O ther-Aircraft model in state Waiting-To-Send), the intruder model with the highest priority (highest Traffic-Score) takes precedence. The variable Advisory-Code contains the advisory relating to an intruder.
The interface definition in Figure 5 defines the communication with the pilot's display. If the intruder is considered a Threat (that is, if it may collide with the aircraft) the value of Advisory-Code will be Resolution-Advisory. The interface is parameterized (set up as arrays), and any O ther-Aircraft can generate a trigger event for this handler. The handler will simply be instantiated with that 
Safety and liveness ver ification
In TCAS, one safety constraint might be that we cannot remove a Resolution-Advisory from the pilot's display as long as the intruder that caused the advisory remains a threat-that is, O ther-Aircraft is in state Threat. (Although a reasonable constraint, this is not a constraint used in TCAS. We use it only as an illustration.) TCAS declares an intruding aircraft to be a threat when it determines that a near mid-air collision is imminent. We may, however, display a ResolutionAdvisory against an intruder that is not a threat.
Informally, the constraint in Figure 6 states that if we attempt to output an advisory for an intruder that is a threat it must be a Resolution-Advisory. If the interfaces encapsulate all interactions with the environment, we can verify this type of communications constraint by only considering the interface specifications.
The verification approach has two simple steps. First, we determine which handlers can output the variable of interest. Second, we show that guarding condition g in those handlers implies constraint c (g ⇒ c).
We can use a similar approach to prove simple liveness constraints. For example, if a certain input arrives and its value is outside expected boundaries, we may always want to initiate a system shutdown or recovery procedure. In this case, however, we want to show that all handlers that receive a certain input and have guarding-condition g implied by the liveness constraint c (c ⇒ g) always generate the desired shutdown/recovery event as an action.
To evaluate the constraint verification, we developed our prototype tool. It is based on an existing execution environment and analysis tool for RSM L, but uses communication-related safety and liveness constraints as input. O ur tool generates proof obligations in the Prototype Verification System specification language 12 and uses the PVS theorem prover to perform the proofs.
Gener ating pr oof obligations for PVS
PVS provides an interactive environment for developing and analyzing formal specifications. It consists of a specification language, parser, type checker, interactive theorem prover, and various browsing tools.
As an illustration of our approach, consider the interface definition in Figure 5 and the constraint in Figure 6 . Clearly, we cannot prove the constraint from the information provided in this interface specification. Furthermore, since it specifies only when components are allowed to send but not when they are prohibited from sending, the interface in Figure 5 is incomplete. Figure 7 shows the same interface extended to handle
• the normal case when components are allowed to send an advisory, • the case where it is not allowed to send an advisory, and • the case where we have a safety violation.
O ur tool generates a PVS theory for each handler and constraint in an RSM L specification via a two-stage process. First, we define each predicate in the AN D/O R table as a predicate in the PVS specification language. (In PVS, a predicate is a function that returns Boolean values.) Second, a predicate representing the full guarding condition (or constraint) is built from the individual predicates defined in the first stage. In PVS, the theory shown in Figure 8a captures the constraint in Figure 6 . We define the constants and type definitions used in the system as separate theories and import them to the theory defining the constraint (or handler).
We want to prove that only certain circumstances will cause the generation of an Advisory-Code[i] with the value Resolution-Advisory. Because of this, our analysis algorithm will identify H andler-1 in Figure 7 and generate a PVS theory for that handler. O ur tool generates the actual proof obligations based on the criteria described in the section on safety and liveness verification. Figure 8b shows the proof obligation for this example. In this case, we want to show that the precondition (guarding condition) for the communication implies that the constraint is true. The tool fully automates the translation to PVS and in most cases a predefined PVS strategy can complete the proofs.
S
ince some interface specifications in our case study were complex and included universal quantification, we chose PVS as our verification tool. PVS can, however, be unnecessarily powerful. In many cases, methods such as formal inspection or verification tools based on decision procedures will suffice. We are currently modifying our tools to allow the user to select the verification technique most suited for a problem.
We are also extending our tool set so that our notion of interfaces can be specified for other tools and applications. Therefore, a model of an embedded system need not consist of only RSM L components but might include a variety of different types of simulations or even hardware. Creating a heterogeneous simulation and execution environment will allow a flexible and realistic evaluation of a system and provide a powerful tool for dynamic evaluation of formal specifications. y
